In August 2018, The Jurist’s Corner speculated that the question of the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act 2010 (ACA or ObamaCare) might be heading towards the US Supreme Court again in 2019. On 14 December 2018, a District Court for the Northern District of Texas held, in the case of Texas v the United States No. 4:18-cv-00167-O that the ObamaCare, in its entirety, was unconstitutional. This is yet another time the ACA is ruled unconstitutional, but it is the first time since Congress passed the Tax and Jobs Act 2017 eliminating the tax/penalty for a failure to comply with the ObamaCare’s Individual Mandate (i.e. the requirement to buy a health insurance).
So far the ObamaCare has withstood, albeit not in its entirety, several challenges before the federal courts. In 2012 the US Supreme Court ruled in the case of National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius 567 U.S. 519 2012 that, inter alia, although the Individual Mandate was not a valid exercise of the Congress’s power to regulate inter-state commerce, the penalty for its breach could be read as a tax and thereby be a valid exercise of the Congress’s taxation power instead. This is because the so called ‘penalty’ for breaching the Mandate was limited to a financial fee processed by the IRS together with individuals’ income taxes. This saving construction persuaded Chief Justice Roberts who joined the 4 liberal Justices on the Court and voted to uphold the Individual Mandate.
However, the Tax and Jobs Act 2017 passed by Congress in 2017 eliminated this tax/penalty while leaving the Individual Mandate as such intact. In those circumstances, several Red States sued in a Texas federal District Court again claiming that the elimination of the tax had rendered the Individual Mandate unconstitutional as now, in the absence of any tax attached to it, it could only be construed as an exercise of the Congress’s power to regulate inter-state commerce and that would violate National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius 567 U.S. 519 2012. The lawsuit went even further claiming that the Individual Mandate was inseverable from the rest of the law, or at least from its certain parts, such as the community rating. As such, the lawsuit argued that in case of finding the Individual Mandate unconstitutional, the Court should strike down the rest of the ObamaCare with it. Shortly afterwards, the Trump Administration announced that it would not to defend the lawsuit, so several Red States led by California intervened in the case submitting briefs in defence of the ACA (The Atlantic).
On 14 December 2018, the Court issued its judgment. Judge O’Connor analysed the effect of the elimination of the tax attached to the Individual Mandate by the Tax and Jobs Act 2017 and found that in the absence of any tax, the Mandate could not possibly fall within the Congress’s taxation power (pp20-27). Next, Judge O’Connor once again considered the possibility of the Individual Mandate being a valid exercise of the power to regulate inter-state commerce but rejected it on the grounds of the Majority Opinion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius 567 U.S. 519 2012 (pp27-34). Ultimately, “the Court [found that] the Individual Mandate is no longer fairly readable as an exercise of Congress’s Tax Power and continues to be unsustainable under Congress’s Interstate Commerce Power. The Court therefore finds the Individual Mandate, unmoored from a tax, is unconstitutional...” (p34).
At this point, the main question became whether the Individual Mandate was severable from the rest of the ObamaCare so that the rest of the ACA could remain in force. Judge O’Connor examined the approach of the Supreme Court to the question of the severability of the Individual Mandate in both National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius 567 U.S. 519 2012 and King v. Burwell 576 U.S. ___ (2015) and summarised:
“The ACA’s text and the Supreme Court’s decisions in NFIB and King thus make clear the Individual Mandate is inseverable from the ACA. As Justice Ginsburg explained, “Congress could have taken over the health-insurance market by establishing a tax-and-spend federal program like Social Security.” Id. at 595 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor, JJ.). But it did not. “Instead of going this route, Congress enacted the ACA . . . To make its chosen approach work, however, Congress had to use . . . a requirement that most individuals obtain private health insurance coverage.” Id. (citing 26 U.S.C.§ 5000A). That requirement—the Individual Mandate—was essential to the ACA’s architecture. Congress intended it to place the Act’s myriad parts in perfect tension. Without it, Congress and the Supreme Court have stated, that architectural design fails. “Without a mandate, premiums would skyrocket. The guaranteed issue and community rating provisions, in the absence of the individual mandate, would create an unsustainable death spiral of costs, thus crippling the entire law.” BLACKMAN, supra note 3, at 147; accord NFIB, 567 U.S. at 597 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor, JJ.) (noting the mandate was essential to staving off “skyrocketing insurance premium costs”). Congress simply never intended failure.” (p47)
Next, Judge O’Connor analysed the potential effect of retaining the rest of ObamaCare, in the absence of the Individual Mandate, on other major provisions of the ACA:
“Even if the Court preferred to ignore the clear text of § 18091 and parse the ACA’s provisions one by one, the text- and precedent-based conclusion would only be reinforced: Upholding the ACA in the absence of the Individual Mandate would change the “effect” of the ACA “as a whole.” See Alton, 295 U.S. at 362. For example, the Individual Mandate reduces the financial risk forced upon insurance companies and their customers by the ACA’s major regulations and taxes. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 18091(2)(C), (I). If the regulations and taxes were severed from the Individual Mandate, insurance companies would face billions of dollars in ACA-imposed regulatory and tax costs without the benefit of an expanded risk pool and customer base—a choice no Congress made and one contrary to the text. See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 698 (joint dissent); 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(C) and (I).” (p48)
“Similarly, the ACA “reduce[d] payments by the Federal Government to hospitals by more than $200 billion over 10 years.” NFIB, 567 U.S. at 699 (joint dissent). Without the Individual Mandate (or forced Medicaid expansion), hospitals would encounter massive losses due to providing uncompensated care. See BLACKMAN, supra note 3, at 2–4 (discussing the freerider and cost-shifting problems in healthcare).” (p48)
“The story is the same with respect to the ACA’s other major provisions, too. The ACA allocates billions of dollars in subsidies to help individuals purchase a government-designed health-insurance product on exchanges established by the States (or the federal government). See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 36B; 42 U.S.C. § 18071. But if the Individual Mandate falls, and especially if the pre-existing-condition provisions fall, upholding the subsidies and exchanges would transform the ACA into a law that subsidizes the kinds of discriminatory products Congress sought to abolish at, presumably, the re-inflated prices it sought to suppress.” (pp48-49)
“Nor did Congress ever contemplate, never mind intend, a duty on employers, see 26 U.S.C. § 4980H, to cover the “skyrocketing insurance premium costs” of their employees that would inevitably result from removing “a key component of the ACA.” (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor, JJ.). And the Medicaid-expansion provisions were designed to serve and assist fulfillment of the Individual Mandate and offset reduced hospital reimbursements by aiding “low-income individuals who are simply not able to obtain insurance.” Id. at 685 (joint dissent).” (p49)
“The result is no different with respect to the ACA’s minor provisions. For example, the Intervenor Defendants assert that, “[i]n addition to protecting consumers with preexisting medical conditions, Congress also enacted the guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions to reduce administrative costs and lower premiums.” Intervenor Defs.’ Resp. 35, ECF No. 91; see also id. at 34 (“Congress independently sought to end discriminatory underwriting practices and to lower administrative costs.”). But Congress stated explicitly that the Individual Mandate “is essential to creating effective health insurance markets that do not require underwriting and eliminate its associated administrative costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(J) (emphasis added). At any rate, to the extent most of the minor provisions “are mere adjuncts of the” now-unconstitutional Individual Mandate and nonmandatory Medicaid expansion, “or mere aids to their effective execution,” if the Individual Mandate “be stricken down as invalid” then “the existence of the [minor provisions] becomes without object.” Williams, 278 U.S. at 243.” (pp49-50).
On that basis Judge O’Connor held:
“…Congress was explicit: The Individual Mandate is essential to the ACA, and that essentiality requires the mandate to work together with the Act’s other provisions. See 42 U.S.C. § 18091. If the “other provisions” were severed and preserved, they would no longer be working together with the mandate and therefore no longer working as Congress intended. On that basis alone, the Court must find the Individual Mandate inseverable from the ACA. To find otherwise would be to introduce an entirely new regulatory scheme never intended by Congress or signed by the President.” (pp47-48).
“In the face of overwhelming textual and Supreme Court clarity, the Court finds “it is ‘unthinkable’ and ‘impossible’ that the Congress would have created the” ACA’s delicately balanced regulatory scheme without the Individual Mandate. Alton, 295 U.S. at 362. The Individual Mandate “so affect[s] the dominant aim of the whole statute as to carry it down with” it. Id. To find otherwise would “rewrite [the ACA] and give it an effect altogether different from that sought by the measure viewed as a whole.” Alton, 295 U.S. at 362. Employing such a strained view of severance would be tantamount to “legislative work beyond the power and function of the court.” Wallace, 259 U.S. at 70.” (pp50-51)
Finally, Judge O’Connor rejected the argument that in 2017, when passing the Tax and Jobs Act 2017, Congress indicated that the Individual Mandate was severable from the rest of the ObamaCare because it did not repeal the rest of the ACA while eliminating the tax attached to the Individual Mandate (pp52-54). In conclusion, the Court held that:
“In some ways, the question before the Court involves the intent of both the 2010 and 2017 Congresses. The former enacted the ACA. The latter sawed off the last leg it stood on. But however one slices it, the following is clear: The 2010 Congress memorialized that it knew the Individual Mandate was the ACA keystone, see 42 U.S.C. § 18091; the Supreme Court stated repeatedly that it knew Congress knew that, see, e.g., NFIB, 567 U.S. at 547 (Roberts, C.J.) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(F)); King, 135 S. Ct. at 2487 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I)); and knowing the Supreme Court knew what the 2010 Congress had known, the 2017 Congress did not repeal the Individual Mandate and did not repeal § 18091.” (pp54-55)
The ruling is now bound to be appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and then probably to the US Supreme Court. The appeal proceedings will likely focus on the question of the severability of the Individual Mandate from the rest of the ObamaCare. With the new judgment and the prospects of future appeals, it seems that the ObamaCare has now become the most litigated issue of our time.