The ceremony of swearing in of Lord Sales as a new Justice of the UK Supreme Court
On 10 January 2019, the European Court of Human Rights ruled, in the case of Wunderlich v. Germany (App. no.: 18925/15), that the German ban on homeschooling did not breach the right to private and family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The case was brought by a Christian family who had refused to register their oldest daughter in a school in accordance with German law. As a result, they were fined and prosecuted by the German authorities and the child was temporary taken into care to enforce the school attendance requirement.
The European Court of Human Rights held that the actions of the German state, although interfered with the Article 8(1) rights, were justified for the purposes of protecting the health, rights and freedoms of the children (under Article 8(2)). When considering the case, the Court referred to its previous jurisprudence on the issue of compulsory public education. It recalled that “the State, in introducing such a system, had aimed at ensuring the integration of children into society with a view to avoiding the emergence of parallel societies, considerations that were in line with the Court’s own case-law on the importance of pluralism for democracy and which fell within the Contracting States’ margin of appreciation in setting up and interpreting rules for their education systems...” (para 50).
The Court held further that although the removal of the child from the parent’s care was a very intrusive measure, it was not disproportionate given that it was only temporary and that all other measures (such as fines and regulatory penalties) had already failed to persuade the parents to comply with the school requirement. In considering the question of proportionality, the Court gave “due account to the margin of appreciation to be accorded to the competent national authorities, which had the benefit of direct contact with all of the persons concerned, often at the very stage when care measures are being envisaged or immediately after their implementation...” (para 47).
The case leaves no doubt that homeschooling is not protected under the European Convention on Human Rights. In contrast, the US Supreme Court has ruled on several occasions that the US Constitution protects the right to homeschooling. As early as 1925, in the case of Pierce, Governor of Oregon, et al. v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the Court struck down an Oregon statute requiring all children to attend public school. It was held that children were not ‘the mere creature[s] of the state’ (para 535) and that the responsibility for education belonged to parents so the Court deemed the ability to make educational choices a ‘liberty’ within the meaning of the 14th Amendment (thereby expanding the so called Substantive Due Process doctrine in its jurisprudence). Furthermore, almost 50 years later, in the case of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court also upheld the right of an Amish family to withdraw their children from public school past 8th grade It was ruled that States could not force families to send their children to attend school where it would infringe their (legitimate) religious beliefs protected under the First Amendment.
In June 2018, the US Supreme Court ruled 7-2, in the case of Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 584 U.S. (2018), that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission had violated a Christian baker’s freedom of religion under the First Amendment when it punished him for refusing to create a personalised wedding cake for a gay couple. The Court held that the Commission, when considering the case, manifested hostility towards the baker’s religious beliefs.
Shortly afterwards, the Masterpiece Cakeshop got involved in another incident when it refused to make a cake with a transgender message, which, despite the earlier ruling from the Supreme Court, led to yet another set of proceedings before the Colorado Civil Rights Commission (The Denver Post). In August 2018, the Masterpiece Cakeshop owner sued the State of Colorado in a federal District Court claiming religious persecution. The lawsuit alleges violation of the First and the 14th Amendments. On 08 January 2019, Judge Wiley Y. Daniel of the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado ruled that the lawsuit against Colorado could proceed (Fox News).
The case is considered of high importance as it is likely that regardless of its outcome before the District Court, it will move up the judicial ladder towards the Supreme Court. Although the Court has already ruled on this issue, its conclusions were reached on very narrow grounds. The wider question of the priority of the freedom of religion under the First Amendment over non-discrimination legislation still remains open.
On 21 December 2018, the US Supreme Court announced that Justice Ginsburg had had surgery at Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center in New York to remove two malignant growths from her left lung. It was also reported that doctors had found ‘no evidence of disease elsewhere in the body’ and no further treatment was planned at this point. Apparently, the growths were spotted during tests she had after fracturing her ribs in a fall on 7 November 2018. Since her appointment in 1993, Justice Ginsburg has already had 3 cancer-related procedures (ABC).
Justice Ginsburg is the oldest sitting Justice of the Court. She was originally appointed by President Clinton in 1993 at the age of 60 as the second woman ever appointed to the US Supreme Court. She is a known liberal who openly opposed the candidacy of Donald Trump during the 2016 presidential election (CNN). In fact, it is common knowledge that Justice Ginsburg will not voluntarily retire during a Republican president. Given her age, she was pressured to retire during the second term of the Obama’s presidency in case his predecessor turned out to be a Republican but she did not cave (NY Times). Now that President Trump appoints strictly conservative judges to the federal benches, Justice Ginsburg embraces herself to wait out his term in office. During the next presidential election in 2020, she will be 87 but her retirement plans will necessarily depend on whether President Trump is re-elected or not. If President Trump wins again in 2020, Justice Ginsburg will have no choice but to endure yet another 4 years on the bench. If successful, this would bring her to over 91 thereby beating the current record-holder, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who stepped down at the age of 90 years and 10 months. She would also beat her former colleague Justice John Paul Stevens, who retired in 2010 at the age of 90 years and 2 months. Justice Ginsburg, despite her history of cancer and regular nodding-off during official events, remains active both as an opinion writer on the bench as well as a public speaker outside the Court.
In August 2018, The Jurist’s Corner speculated that the question of the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act 2010 (ACA or ObamaCare) might be heading towards the US Supreme Court again in 2019. On 14 December 2018, a District Court for the Northern District of Texas held, in the case of Texas v the United States No. 4:18-cv-00167-O that the ObamaCare, in its entirety, was unconstitutional. This is yet another time the ACA is ruled unconstitutional, but it is the first time since Congress passed the Tax and Jobs Act 2017 eliminating the tax/penalty for a failure to comply with the ObamaCare’s Individual Mandate (i.e. the requirement to buy a health insurance).
So far the ObamaCare has withstood, albeit not in its entirety, several challenges before the federal courts. In 2012 the US Supreme Court ruled in the case of National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius 567 U.S. 519 2012 that, inter alia, although the Individual Mandate was not a valid exercise of the Congress’s power to regulate inter-state commerce, the penalty for its breach could be read as a tax and thereby be a valid exercise of the Congress’s taxation power instead. This is because the so called ‘penalty’ for breaching the Mandate was limited to a financial fee processed by the IRS together with individuals’ income taxes. This saving construction persuaded Chief Justice Roberts who joined the 4 liberal Justices on the Court and voted to uphold the Individual Mandate.
However, the Tax and Jobs Act 2017 passed by Congress in 2017 eliminated this tax/penalty while leaving the Individual Mandate as such intact. In those circumstances, several Red States sued in a Texas federal District Court again claiming that the elimination of the tax had rendered the Individual Mandate unconstitutional as now, in the absence of any tax attached to it, it could only be construed as an exercise of the Congress’s power to regulate inter-state commerce and that would violate National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius 567 U.S. 519 2012. The lawsuit went even further claiming that the Individual Mandate was inseverable from the rest of the law, or at least from its certain parts, such as the community rating. As such, the lawsuit argued that in case of finding the Individual Mandate unconstitutional, the Court should strike down the rest of the ObamaCare with it. Shortly afterwards, the Trump Administration announced that it would not to defend the lawsuit, so several Red States led by California intervened in the case submitting briefs in defence of the ACA (The Atlantic).
On 14 December 2018, the Court issued its judgment. Judge O’Connor analysed the effect of the elimination of the tax attached to the Individual Mandate by the Tax and Jobs Act 2017 and found that in the absence of any tax, the Mandate could not possibly fall within the Congress’s taxation power (pp20-27). Next, Judge O’Connor once again considered the possibility of the Individual Mandate being a valid exercise of the power to regulate inter-state commerce but rejected it on the grounds of the Majority Opinion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius 567 U.S. 519 2012 (pp27-34). Ultimately, “the Court [found that] the Individual Mandate is no longer fairly readable as an exercise of Congress’s Tax Power and continues to be unsustainable under Congress’s Interstate Commerce Power. The Court therefore finds the Individual Mandate, unmoored from a tax, is unconstitutional...” (p34).
At this point, the main question became whether the Individual Mandate was severable from the rest of the ObamaCare so that the rest of the ACA could remain in force. Judge O’Connor examined the approach of the Supreme Court to the question of the severability of the Individual Mandate in both National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius 567 U.S. 519 2012 and King v. Burwell 576 U.S. ___ (2015) and summarised:
“The ACA’s text and the Supreme Court’s decisions in NFIB and King thus make clear the Individual Mandate is inseverable from the ACA. As Justice Ginsburg explained, “Congress could have taken over the health-insurance market by establishing a tax-and-spend federal program like Social Security.” Id. at 595 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor, JJ.). But it did not. “Instead of going this route, Congress enacted the ACA . . . To make its chosen approach work, however, Congress had to use . . . a requirement that most individuals obtain private health insurance coverage.” Id. (citing 26 U.S.C.§ 5000A). That requirement—the Individual Mandate—was essential to the ACA’s architecture. Congress intended it to place the Act’s myriad parts in perfect tension. Without it, Congress and the Supreme Court have stated, that architectural design fails. “Without a mandate, premiums would skyrocket. The guaranteed issue and community rating provisions, in the absence of the individual mandate, would create an unsustainable death spiral of costs, thus crippling the entire law.” BLACKMAN, supra note 3, at 147; accord NFIB, 567 U.S. at 597 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor, JJ.) (noting the mandate was essential to staving off “skyrocketing insurance premium costs”). Congress simply never intended failure.” (p47)
Next, Judge O’Connor analysed the potential effect of retaining the rest of ObamaCare, in the absence of the Individual Mandate, on other major provisions of the ACA:
“Even if the Court preferred to ignore the clear text of § 18091 and parse the ACA’s provisions one by one, the text- and precedent-based conclusion would only be reinforced: Upholding the ACA in the absence of the Individual Mandate would change the “effect” of the ACA “as a whole.” See Alton, 295 U.S. at 362. For example, the Individual Mandate reduces the financial risk forced upon insurance companies and their customers by the ACA’s major regulations and taxes. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 18091(2)(C), (I). If the regulations and taxes were severed from the Individual Mandate, insurance companies would face billions of dollars in ACA-imposed regulatory and tax costs without the benefit of an expanded risk pool and customer base—a choice no Congress made and one contrary to the text. See NFIB, 567 U.S. at 698 (joint dissent); 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(C) and (I).” (p48)
“Similarly, the ACA “reduce[d] payments by the Federal Government to hospitals by more than $200 billion over 10 years.” NFIB, 567 U.S. at 699 (joint dissent). Without the Individual Mandate (or forced Medicaid expansion), hospitals would encounter massive losses due to providing uncompensated care. See BLACKMAN, supra note 3, at 2–4 (discussing the freerider and cost-shifting problems in healthcare).” (p48)
“The story is the same with respect to the ACA’s other major provisions, too. The ACA allocates billions of dollars in subsidies to help individuals purchase a government-designed health-insurance product on exchanges established by the States (or the federal government). See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 36B; 42 U.S.C. § 18071. But if the Individual Mandate falls, and especially if the pre-existing-condition provisions fall, upholding the subsidies and exchanges would transform the ACA into a law that subsidizes the kinds of discriminatory products Congress sought to abolish at, presumably, the re-inflated prices it sought to suppress.” (pp48-49)
“Nor did Congress ever contemplate, never mind intend, a duty on employers, see 26 U.S.C. § 4980H, to cover the “skyrocketing insurance premium costs” of their employees that would inevitably result from removing “a key component of the ACA.” (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor, JJ.). And the Medicaid-expansion provisions were designed to serve and assist fulfillment of the Individual Mandate and offset reduced hospital reimbursements by aiding “low-income individuals who are simply not able to obtain insurance.” Id. at 685 (joint dissent).” (p49)
“The result is no different with respect to the ACA’s minor provisions. For example, the Intervenor Defendants assert that, “[i]n addition to protecting consumers with preexisting medical conditions, Congress also enacted the guaranteed-issue and community-rating provisions to reduce administrative costs and lower premiums.” Intervenor Defs.’ Resp. 35, ECF No. 91; see also id. at 34 (“Congress independently sought to end discriminatory underwriting practices and to lower administrative costs.”). But Congress stated explicitly that the Individual Mandate “is essential to creating effective health insurance markets that do not require underwriting and eliminate its associated administrative costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(J) (emphasis added). At any rate, to the extent most of the minor provisions “are mere adjuncts of the” now-unconstitutional Individual Mandate and nonmandatory Medicaid expansion, “or mere aids to their effective execution,” if the Individual Mandate “be stricken down as invalid” then “the existence of the [minor provisions] becomes without object.” Williams, 278 U.S. at 243.” (pp49-50).
On that basis Judge O’Connor held:
“…Congress was explicit: The Individual Mandate is essential to the ACA, and that essentiality requires the mandate to work together with the Act’s other provisions. See 42 U.S.C. § 18091. If the “other provisions” were severed and preserved, they would no longer be working together with the mandate and therefore no longer working as Congress intended. On that basis alone, the Court must find the Individual Mandate inseverable from the ACA. To find otherwise would be to introduce an entirely new regulatory scheme never intended by Congress or signed by the President.” (pp47-48).
“In the face of overwhelming textual and Supreme Court clarity, the Court finds “it is ‘unthinkable’ and ‘impossible’ that the Congress would have created the” ACA’s delicately balanced regulatory scheme without the Individual Mandate. Alton, 295 U.S. at 362. The Individual Mandate “so affect[s] the dominant aim of the whole statute as to carry it down with” it. Id. To find otherwise would “rewrite [the ACA] and give it an effect altogether different from that sought by the measure viewed as a whole.” Alton, 295 U.S. at 362. Employing such a strained view of severance would be tantamount to “legislative work beyond the power and function of the court.” Wallace, 259 U.S. at 70.” (pp50-51)
Finally, Judge O’Connor rejected the argument that in 2017, when passing the Tax and Jobs Act 2017, Congress indicated that the Individual Mandate was severable from the rest of the ObamaCare because it did not repeal the rest of the ACA while eliminating the tax attached to the Individual Mandate (pp52-54). In conclusion, the Court held that:
“In some ways, the question before the Court involves the intent of both the 2010 and 2017 Congresses. The former enacted the ACA. The latter sawed off the last leg it stood on. But however one slices it, the following is clear: The 2010 Congress memorialized that it knew the Individual Mandate was the ACA keystone, see 42 U.S.C. § 18091; the Supreme Court stated repeatedly that it knew Congress knew that, see, e.g., NFIB, 567 U.S. at 547 (Roberts, C.J.) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(F)); King, 135 S. Ct. at 2487 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I)); and knowing the Supreme Court knew what the 2010 Congress had known, the 2017 Congress did not repeal the Individual Mandate and did not repeal § 18091.” (pp54-55)
The ruling is now bound to be appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and then probably to the US Supreme Court. The appeal proceedings will likely focus on the question of the severability of the Individual Mandate from the rest of the ObamaCare. With the new judgment and the prospects of future appeals, it seems that the ObamaCare has now become the most litigated issue of our time.
On 27 November 2018, in the case of R (on the application of Conway) v Secretary of State for Justice  UKSC B1, the UK Supreme Court refused to consider an appeal from the High Court (Divisional Court) where the Court had upheld the ban on assisted suicide as compatible with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Assisted suicide remains illegal in the United Kingdom under the Suicide Act 1961, s2(1), despite numerous attempts to overturn the ban as in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights. In its short opinion, the Supreme Court relied on previous precedents from the European Court of Human Rights leaving the question of the so called ‘right to die’ for states to decide. As the decision was merely on the application for permission to appeal, the Claimant had to demonstrate only a ‘prospect of success’ upon a full hearing that would justify giving the permission. Nevertheless, the Court held “not without some reluctance […] that in this case those prospects are not sufficient to justify giving permission to appeal” (at para. 8).
Since the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, rendering the European Convention on Human Rights directly applicable in the United Kingdom, there have been several challenges to the Suicide Act 1961 as incompatible with the Convention. Most notably, in the case of Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1, following a dismissal by the UK House of Lords, the European Court of Human Rights also ruled that Article 2 of the Convention could not be interpreted as containing any right to die. It was further held that although the ban on assisted suicide interfered with the right to private life under Article 8(1) of the Convention, it could be justified ‘for the protection of the rights of others’ under Article 8(2). 13 years later, a similar challenge was mounted in the case of Nicklinson v United Kingdom (2015) 61 EHRR SE7 but the European Court of Human Rights maintained its position from 2002 relying on a wide margin of appreciation states enjoyed on the question of assisted suicide. Interestingly, before the case reached the European Court of Human Rights, the UK Supreme Court (having succeeded the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords), had followed Pretty only 7-2, with Lady Hale and Lord Kerr dissenting. In her Dissenting Opinion, Lady Hale “reached the firm conclusion that [the] law [was] not compatible with the Convention rights […and…] little [was] to be gained, and much to be lost, by refraining from making a declaration of incompatibility.” (R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice  UKSC 38 at para. 300).
Paradoxically, Lady Hale and Lord Kerr, who were both willing to hold the ban on assisted suicide incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights in 2014, constituted the majority of the Supreme Court panel (along with Lord Reed) refusing the permission to appeal in Conway. In fact, they were in the position to accept the case on behalf of the Court, even in the face of opposition of Lord Reed.
On 15 November 2018, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights ruled unanimously in the case of Navalny v Russia (App. no.: 29580/12) that the treatment of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny by the Russian government had violated his rights under:
- Article 5 of the Convention (concerning arbitrary arrest on 7 occasions and pre-trial detention on 2 occasions);
- Article 6 of the Convention (concerning 6 out of 7 administrative proceedings leading to his conviction of administrative offences);
- Article 11 of the Convention (concerning the inability to peacefully assemble).
Furthermore, the Court also held 14-3 that there had been a breach of Article 18 considered in conjunction with Article 5 and Article 11 of the Convention. At the end, the Court ordered the Russian government to pay €50,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, €1,025 in respect of pecuniary damage and €12,653 in respect of costs and expenses, which adds up to €63,678 in total. The ruling comes after the Russian government appealed against the original judgment of the Third Section of the European Court of Human Rights. The Grand Chamber has now upheld the main bulk of the Third Section’s reasoning unanimously dismissing the Government’s objection:
- of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 5 of the Convention;
- of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies under Article 11 of the Convention;
- as to the failure to comply with the six-months rule under Article 18 of the Convention.
Mr Navalny lodged a complaint against the Russian government in 2014 effectively claiming a political persecution through different methods and over an extensive period of time. In respect of Article 5, Navalny complained about having been arbitrarily arrested on 7 occasions while attending peaceful demonstrations, including twice for an alleged failure to obey a police order (on 9 May 2012 and 24 February 2014) and about having been detained for over 3 hours in violation of the statutory time-limit pending his trial (paras. 68-9). In respect of Article 6, Navalny argued that on all 7 occasions when he was arrested, he was unfairly convicted of an administrative offence in violation of his right to a fair hearing, including the right to the equality of arms, presumption of innocence, impartiality of the tribunal and the adversarial nature of the proceedings (para. 73). In respect of Article 11, Navalny claimed that arresting him 7 times while attending peaceful demonstrations had violated his freedom of peaceful assembly (para. 85).
Finally, in respect of Article 18 (stipulating that “the restrictions permitted under [the] Convention to the said rights and freedoms shall not be applied for any purpose other than those for which they have been prescribed”), arguably the most interesting element of Mr Navalny’s claim, he:
“156. … submitted that since the 2011-2012 protest rallies in which he played a leading role, the authorities had become wary of his participation in any kind of informal gathering. They sought to punish him for his political criticism and took steps to discourage his supporters. He was specifically and personally targeted by the authorities who acted to suppress political dissent. He referred, in particular, to the footage of his arrest in front of the courthouse on 24 February 2014 (the sixth episode). He also alleged that he had been arrested even though the gatherings in question had been peaceful and had raised no public-order issues. The procedure set out by law for drawing up the administrative offence report had been manipulated so as to remove him from the event venue unnecessarily and to detain him without a lawful purpose. Whilst he had promoted the ideas and values of a democratic society … and as the most prominent opposition figure advocating these values, he had been harassed precisely because of his active engagement in political life and the influence that he had on the political views of the Russian people.“
On that subject, the Court held that:
“168. … It cannot be overlooked that the arrests took place in the context of the applicant exercising his Convention right to freedom of assembly. The Court finds that a certain pattern may be discerned from the series of seven episodes. Moreover, the pretexts for the arrests were becoming progressively more implausible, whereas the degree of potential or actual disorder caused by the applicant diminished. It is also noteworthy that in the first four episodes the applicant was one of the leaders of the gatherings, and this could explain to a certain extent why he was among the first persons to be arrested. However, this was not the case in the subsequent episodes where the applicant did not play any special role.
169. In the fifth episode (on 27 October 2012) the applicant was one of some thirty activists taking part consecutively in a stationary demonstration. There were several prominent public figures among the participants and no obvious leadership. Moreover, according to the official version, the applicant was arrested not in connection with the demonstration itself but for holding a “march” when he was walking away from the venue followed by a group of people, including journalists. Nothing suggests that the applicant had arranged for these people to accompany him, or that he was somehow in charge of his followers or that he was in a position to control them in the very brief moments before his arrest (see paragraph 32 above).
170. An equally evident example was the sixth episode (on 24 February 2014) with his arrest in front of the courthouse, where he was merely one of the persons waiting to be allowed inside the building to attend the public hearing. The police deliberately divided the crowd to retrieve the applicant and remove him from the venue, although nothing in his conduct or appearance distinguished him from other peaceful individuals quietly waiting behind the police cordon. In this episode it is particularly difficult to dismiss the applicant’s allegation that he was specifically and personally targeted as a known activist, even in the most innocuous situation remotely resembling a public gathering (see paragraph 156 above).
171. In this context, the Court’s observation in Merabishvili to the effect that in a continuous situation the predominant purpose may vary over time (§ 308) assumes particular significance. It may well appear that the predominant purpose of the measures taken against the applicant has indeed changed over the period under examination. What might possibly have seemed a legitimate aim or purpose at the outset appears less plausible over time. Thus, as held in paragraphs 126 and 127 above, whereas the Court has serious doubts that any legitimate aim as claimed by the Government existed on the first four occasions, it has found that no such aim was present on the fifth and sixth occasions, and was again highly questionable on the seventh occasion. Also, as noted above, the violations in the present case occurred despite the authorities’ increasing awareness that the practices in question were incompatible with Convention standards (see paragraph 149 above). In this connection, the Court considers that regard should also be had to the wider context (ibid., § 317), notably to its similar findings in Navalnyy and Yashin (cited above) with regard to a demonstration three months before the first of the seven episodes in the present case. Equally relevant to the general context are its findings with regard to the sequence of events that unfolded in two sets of criminal proceedings which were being conducted against the applicant in parallel. In one case it found that the national courts had “omitted to address” and “had heightened … concerns that the real reason for the applicant’s prosecution and conviction had been a political one” (see Navalnyy and Ofitserov, cited above, §§ 116-19). In the other it held that the applicant’s criminal sentence was “arbitrary and manifestly unreasonable”, that the law was “extensively and unforeseeably construed” and applied in an arbitrary manner which flawed the proceedings “in such a fundamental way that it rendered other criminal procedure guarantees irrelevant” (see Navalnyye v. Russia, no. 101/15, §§ 83-84, 17 October 2017).
172. In addition, there is converging contextual evidence corroborating the view that the authorities were becoming increasingly severe in their response to the conduct of the applicant, in the light of his position as opposition leader, and of other political activists and, more generally, in their approach to public assemblies of a political nature. The Court has previously noted the important legislative changes which took place in the reference period, increasing and expanding liability for a breach of the procedure for conducting public events (see Lashmankin and Others, cited above, §§ 301-06). In particular, the maximum amount of the fine payable for such offences was increased by twenty times; new types of aggravated offences were introduced with correspondingly severe sanctions; and the limitation period for the offences in question was extended. Further restrictions of the legislative framework on freedom of assembly introduced in July 2014, including criminal liability for assembly-related offences, although falling outside the period under consideration, may be noted as a continuous trend…
173. Against this background, the applicant’s claim that his exercise of freedom of assembly has become a particular object for targeted suppression appears coherent within the broader context of the Russian authorities’ attempts at the material time to bring the opposition’s political activity under control. At this point, the Court considers it appropriate to have regard to the nature and degree of reprehensibility of the alleged ulterior purpose, bearing in mind that the Convention was designed to maintain and promote the ideals and values of a democratic society governed by the rule of law (seeMerabishvili, cited above, § 307).
174. At the core of the applicant’s Article 18 complaint is his alleged persecution, not as a private individual, but as an opposition politician committed to playing an important public function through democratic discourse. As such, the restriction in question would have affected not merely the applicant alone, or his fellow opposition activists and supporters, but the very essence of democracy as a means of organising society, in which individual freedom may only be limited in the general interest, that is, in the name of a “higher freedom” referred to in the travaux préparatoires (see paragraph 51 above). The Court considers that the ulterior purpose thus defined would attain significant gravity.
175. In the light of all the above-mentioned elements, and in particular the sequence and pattern of the events in the present case (see paragraphs 167-68 above), viewed as a whole, the Court finds it established beyond reasonable doubt that the restrictions imposed on the applicant in the fifth and the sixth episodes pursued an ulterior purpose within the meaning of Article 18 of the Convention, namely to suppress that political pluralism which forms part of “effective political democracy” governed by “the rule of law”, both being concepts to which the Preamble to the Convention refers (see, mutatis mutandis, Ždanoka v. Latvia [GC], no. 58278/00, § 98, ECHR 2006‑IV, and Karácsony and Others v. Hungary [GC], nos. 42461/13 and 44357/13, § 147, ECHR 2016 (extracts)). As the Court has pointed out, notably in the context of Articles 10 and 11, pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness are hallmarks of a “democratic society”. Although individual interests must on occasion be subordinated to those of a group, democracy does not simply mean that the views of a majority must always prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures the fair and proper treatment of people from minorities and avoids abuse of a dominant position (see, among other authorities, Young, James and Webster v. the United Kingdom, 13 August 1981, § 63, Series A no. 44; Gorzelik and Others v. Poland [GC], no.44158/98, § 90, ECHR 2004‑I; Leyla Şahin, cited above, § 108; and Karácsony and Others, cited above, § 147).”
Interestingly, the issue of Article 18, unlike other issues in this case, divided the Grand Chamber. Accordingly, the ruling includes a Partly Concurring and Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Pejchal, Dedov, Ravarani, Eicke and Paczolay in which the Judges argued that the abuse of the Convention rights perpetrated by the Russian government should have been dealt with on the basis of Article 17 (stipulating that “nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention“) rather than Article 18 of the Convention (para. 3). The Judges admit in their Joint Opinion that the Court could not have properly considered Article 17 since the complaint had originally been made under Article 18 (paras. 4-5) but they nevertheless decided to elaborate on this subject. Firstly, they claim that Article 17 is clearly applicable to abuses of Convention rights perpetrated by states, not only individuals or groups (paras. 6-19). However, the Judges recognise that such an application of Article 17 is extremely rare. Secondly, the Judges, while admitting that Article 17 and Article 18 have a similar scope of application, distinguish the two on the basis of the difference between an ‘abuse of power’ and a ‘misuse of power’ claiming that
“26. If misuse of power is also undoubtedly an abuse of power, the opposite is not necessarily true. There may be instances of abuse of power when the authorities in taking an individual decision do not, in fact, pursue an ulterior purpose. To use the paradigm of the theory of sets, Article 18 is a subset of Article 17. The concept of abuse of rights is broader than that of misuse of power, meaning that certain acts will be considered “abusive”, not because the purpose is unlawful, but because of the way in which the power was used.”
The Judges conclude:
“33. In light of the above, we are of the view that, if the case had been presented in those terms, an examination of the facts of the present case under Article 17 would have enabled the Court to assess whether the number of individual episodes addressed in the judgment, taken together, are evidence or isolated manifestations of a system that abusively seeks to limit, by legislative, administrative and/or judicial means, the democratic rights of the applicant in a way that substantially runs counter to the purpose and general spirit of the Convention and is aimed at unduly limiting those rights; and to do so without (a) having to adopt a narrow focus on the (administrative) authorities involved in the individual incident under consideration and (b) having to address the difficult issue of whether those authorities, in their response to each individual occasion on which the applicant sought to exercise his fundamental freedom of assembly, pursued an ulterior purpose.”
It seems that the Joint Opinion of Judges Pejchal, Dedov, Ravarani, Eicke and Paczolay by no means was designed to limit the scope of liability on the part of the Russian government, as recognised in the Majority Opinion. To the contrary. Under the approach to Article 17 and Article 18 advocated in the Joint Opinion, the liability of the Russian government for a repeated pattern of abuse of power towards Mr Navalny would probably only deepen. In any event, the Joint Opinion in this case is a rather rare example of the Court, or at least a part of it, trying to clarify confusing rules of application of Articles which are rarely relied on by applicants and therefore not sufficiently explained in the Court’s jurisprudence.
The Chevron Doctrine is the key element of the modern administrative state in the US. It was created by the US Supreme Court in 1984 in the case of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) and since then, it has been a subject of many heated debates among constitutional lawyers (Take Care). Recently, there has been more and more indications that the Court might be changing its mind and considering the Doctrine to be a dead end from which it needs to gallantly retreat. The original decision was unanimous in a sense that all Justices considering the case (Justices Burger, Brennan, White, Blackmun and Powell) joined the Majority Opinion written by Justice Stevens. However the remaining 3 Justices (Justices Marshall, Rehnquist and O’Connor) took no part in the consideration of the case making it an unusual 6-0 decision. The holding of the case is rather simple and dictates that, in cases involving disputes between administrative agencies of the US Government (such as Environmental Protection Agency or Internal Revenue Service) and citizens or corporations, Federal Courts must always defer to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute which it administers, so long as the interpretation is ‘reasonable’. This simple rule of construction has automatically tipped the scales in favour of administrative agencies over ordinary citizens and corporations.
It comes as no surprise that the composition of the Court has changed completely since 1984 and out of those new 9 Justices, at least 3 have publicly disapproved of the Chevron Doctrine. Justice Thomas wrote in his Concurring Opinion in the case of Michigan v. Environmental Protection Agency, 576 U.S. (2015) that “Chevron deference raises serious separation-of-powers questions”. Similarly, Justice Gorsuch in his Opinion in the case of Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, No. 14-9585 (10th Cir. 2016) suggested that the Chevron was “a judge-made doctrine for the abdication of judicial duty” while Justice Kavanaugh described the Chevron Doctrine as ‘troubling’ (Harvard Law Review). It is not hard to see that this makes 1/3 of the current Supreme Court openly hostile to the Chevron Doctrine. The question remains whether the other Justices, especially Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts, share this hostility. This will only become clear once the Supreme Court come to deal with some case involving the Chevron Doctrine. A case like BNSF Railway Company v. Loos 17-1042.
On 14 May 2018, the US Supreme Court (with Justice Kennedy still on the bench) issued a writ of certiorari to the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreeing to hear an appeal in the case of BNSF Railway Company v. Loos 17-1042. The case raises the question of “whether a payment to a railroad employee for lost wages on account of a personal physical injury is subject to employment taxes under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act,” with the Claimant arguing YES and the Respondent arguing NO (SCOTUSBlog). While the Act itself is silent on this issue, the Internal Revenue Service (which is an administrative agency) in its 1994 regulations stipulates that ‘pay for time lost’ is taxable under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act. According to the Chevron Doctrine, given that the statute itself is silent (i.e. ambiguous), deference should be made to the interpretation put forward by the Internal Revenue Service (unless such an interpretation could be proved to be grossly unreasonable). If the Court was minded to follow the Chevron Doctrine, this would be a very simple case for the Claimant. In fact, under the Doctrine, it is surprising that the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled for the (now) Respondent, Mr Loos. The decision of the Court of Appeals might in itself be an indicator that lowers Courts feel that the US Supreme Court will not defend the Chevron Doctrine on appeal.
Interestingly, it is not only the lower Courts that can sense the hostility of the Supreme Court towards the Chevron Doctrine. Lisa Blatt, who appeared before the Court for the Claimant, mentioned the Chevron Doctrine only briefly at the end of her argument, even though the Doctrine clearly favours her client. Furthermore, Rachel Kovner, an assistant to the Solicitor General, who appeared as a ‘friend of the court’ in support of the Claimant, also almost completely ignored the Chevron Doctrine until the last moment before resting her case (SCOTUSBlog). The hostility of the Court transpires also from the questions that the Justices asked during the oral argument stage of the proceedings. Justices Gorsuch and Kegan seemed to be ready to recognise that the silence of the Railroad Retirement Tax Act on the issue of payments in question was not an ambiguity of the statute within the meaning of the Chevron Doctrine therefore making the Doctrine inapplicable in this case. Justice Kavanaugh was also skeptical when it comes to taking the Internal Revenue Service’s interpretation as a given and questioned the Claimant’s lawyer on the historical changes of the Railroad Retirement Tax Act that would suggest that the payment could not be construed as being subject to a tax (SCOTUSBlog).
The holding in the case of BNSF Railway Company v. Loos 17-1042, whatever it might be, may or may not overrule the Chevron Doctrine. However, the very manner in which this case was argued before the Supreme Court suggests that the Doctrine is not popular these days. It is difficult to predict its future at this point, but is seems that even if the Doctrine is no completely overturned one day, the Court might simply drastically limit its scope either by reading ambiguous states as sufficiently unambiguous, so not to bring the Doctrine into play at all, or it might regularly treat interpretations of ambiguous statutes put forward by administrative agencies as grossly unreasonably, therefore not worthy of any special deference under the Doctrine. In either case, any limitation to the the Chevron Doctrine will have a profound impact on the functioning of the administrative state.
Very interestingly, federal jurisprudence is not the only level at which the struggle against the Chevron Doctrine is unfolding. During the midterm election on 6 November 2018, the people of Florida passed the ballot measure called Amendment 6 which prohibits state Courts from deferring to state administrative agencies (such as Florida Department of Revenue) in cases of ambiguous statutes (Florida Today). The measure was clearly designed to rid state law of anything resembling the Chevron Doctrine. Although the Amendment does not apply outside the state of Florida, and even within the state it applies only to state (not federal) law, it is yet another signal that the Chevron Doctrine might be in trouble.
On 2 November 2018, the US Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit in the case of American Humanist Association v Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission No. 15-2597 2017, thereby agreeing to hear the case of a 93-year-old war memorial in the shape of a cross (SCOTUS Blog). The memorial was completed in 1925 to commemorate 49 local residents who had died in World War I. In 2014, the American Humanist Association sued Maryland public bodies responsible for the upkeep of the monument alleging that it “discriminates against patriotic soldiers who are not Christian, sending a callous message to non-Christians that Christians are worthy of veneration while they may as well be forgotten” (Fox News). In 2017, the Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit ruled 2-1 in the case of American Humanist Association v Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission No. 15-2597 2017 that even assuming that the monument had some nonreligious function, “the sectarian elements easily overwhelm the secular ones” and that “the cross is by far the most prominent monument in the area, conspicuously displayed at a busy intersection” [p22] and as such its presence on a public land violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. In March 2018 the Court sitting en benc refused to reconsider the case and Maryland petitioned the Supreme Court for a permission to appeal (The Washington Post).
The jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court in cases concerning the Establishment Clause is far from being clear. The Court has struggled over the years to agree on a set of precise directions as to when a religious symbol on a public land would violate the First Amendment. This has led to confusing rulings whereby some symbols have been upheld and others not. For instance, in 2005, in the case of Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, the Court ruled 5-4 that a Ten Commandments monolith on the Texas State Capitol grounds did not violate the Constitution. On the other hand, on the same day in 2005, in the case of McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844, the Court also ruled 5-4 that a Ten Commandments display at the McCreary County courthouse in Kentucky did violate the First Amendment. The two cases were extremely similar yet the Court reached the opposite conclusions. In both cases it was Justice Breyer who acted as the Swing Vote. With those two cases, the US Supreme Court has sent mixed signals to lower courts on the subject of the Establishment Clause. Nevertheless, the Court is now almost 15 years older and its composition has also changed, presumably became more conservative in nature. As a result, the majority of the bench might now have enough votes to articulate some clear guiding principles as to how lower courts should deal with similar cases in the future.
On 23 October 2018, former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor announced she had dementia (SCOTUSBlog). Justice O’Connor was born in 1930 and was appointed to the US Supreme Court in 1981 by President Reagan as the first woman in history. She sat on the bench until 2006 when she retired and was replaced by Justice Alito appointed by President Bush. Justice O’Connor went down in history not only as the first female Justice of the US Supreme Court but also as the Court’s early Swing Vote. Appointed by a Republican President, Justice O’Connor believed in a limited federal government and as such was part of the so called Rehnquist Revolution whereby the US Supreme Court intended to set limits to the powers of the federal government. With cases such as United States v. Alfonso D. Lopez, Jr., 514 U.S. 549 (1995) and United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), the Rehnquist Court strove to return to the concept of the federal government as a government of enumerated powers after several decades of a rapid federal expansion. Justice O’Connor joined the other Republican-appointed Justices in deciding those cases.
In fact, Justice O’Connor started as a reliable conservative vote siding with (Chief) Justice Rehnquist 87% of the time during her first 3 years on the bench (Greenburg). Since 1984 until 1998, Justice O’Connor’s support for (Chief) Justice Rehnquist’s opinions ranged from 93.4% to 63.2% (Los Angeles Times). With the passage of time, Justice O’Connor started to slowly drift towards the liberal side of the Court and between 1994 and 2004, she voted with the liberal Justices a total of 28 times (Harvard Law Review). This included some key issues such as affirmative action (Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)), religious liberty (Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)) and abortion (Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)). In any event, Justice O’Connor will always be a symbol of an ever-changing Supreme Court.
On 18 October 2018, the European Court of Human Rights ruled in the case of Annen v. Germany (No. 6) (App. No.: 3779/11) that Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights did not protect statements comparing doctors conducting stem-cell research to Nazi experiments. The Claimant was originally convicted before a German court for the crime of ‘insult’ contrary to Article 185 of the German Criminal Code and the case was brought before the European Court of Human Rights on the grounds that the comparison had been made in the context of a larger public debate and was therefore covered by the freedom of speech.
The Claimant argued that the conviction constituted a disproportional interference under Article 10 of the Convention. The state on the other hand argued that the conviction was necessary for the purposes of the “protection of the reputation or rights of others”, which is an allowable exception to the Article 10 rights. Ultimately, the Court held that the conviction fell within the margin of appreciation granted to Germany. It was also emphasised that “regardless of the forcefulness of political struggles, it is legitimate to try to ensure a minimum degree of moderation and propriety and that a clear distinction must be made between criticism and insult.” (para. 24).
With this case, the European Court of Human Rights maintains its limited approach to the Article 10 protection whereby, unlike under the First Amendment to the US Constitution, the freedom of speech does not cover offensive statements, even if made on a topic of public importance (e.g. Handyside v UK (App. No.: 5493/72), Otto-Preminger-Institut v Austria (App. No.: 13470/87), Vejdeland v Sweden (App. No.: 1813/07), etc.).
On 25 August 2018 The Jurist’s Corner speculated about possible legal issues to reach the US Supreme Court in its current term. This included the question of the constitutionality of affirmative action in the light of a DoJ investigation into the admission practice of the Harvard University which allegedly discriminated against Asian-American candidates. It is now confirmed that on 15 October 2018, a lawsuit against the Harvard University alleging race discrimination goes on trial before a federal District Court in Boston. The lawsuit is being brought by the Students for Fair Admissions founded by anti-affirmative action activist Edward Blum, and is supported by the Trump Administration. Affirmative action has been so far upheld by the US Supreme Court on numerous occasions, most recently in 2016 in the case of Fisher v. University of Texas (579 U.S. (2016), commonly referred to as Fisher II. However, even so upheld, affirmative action is legally limited only to situations where no race-neutral solutions would be effective in increasing the number of minority students accepted by a University. The lawsuit now alleges that the Harvard University has not properly considered race-neutral admission schemes before factoring race in its application process (Reuters). In this type of lawsuits, the burden of proof rests on a University to justify the use of race as a consideration in its admission process. On the other hand, if this cases proceeds to the US Supreme Court, it is possible the Court will declare affirmative action unconstitutional in its entirety. Affirmative action has always been very controversial and recent cases were decided 5-4 with Justice Kennedy joining the 4 liberal Justices in upholding it. Now that Justice Kennedy has been replaced by Justice Kavanaugh, it is possible the Court will vote 5-4 to strike down all affirmative action programmes as a form of unconstitutional discrimination under the 14th Amendment.
The judgment of the UK Supreme Court in the case of Lee v Ashers Baking Company Ltd (Northern Ireland)  UKSC 49.
On 10 October 2018, the UK Supreme Court unanimously ruled in the case of Lee v Ashers Baking Company Ltd (Northern Ireland)  UKSC 49 that the business’s refusal to bake a cake with a message supporting gay marriage was completely lawful and not contrary to the Fair Employment and Treatment (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 (made under the Northern Ireland Act 1974) or the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2006 (made under the Equality Act 2006), as claimed by the Claimant. Writing for the Court, Lady Hale argued that “obliging a person to manifest a belief which he does not hold has been held to be a limitation on his article 9(1) rights” under the European Convention on Human Rights (Buscarini v San Marino (1999) 30 EHRR 208) and that “the freedom not to be obliged to hold or to manifest beliefs that one does not hold is also protected by article 10 of the Convention” (RT (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department  UKSC 38;  1 AC 152) [at 50-2]. However, Lady Hale expressly distinguished between refusing to serve a customer based on his or her sexual orientation and forcing a business owner to prepare a product promoting a message he or she profoundly disagreed with [at 55]. Consequently, the Court was cautious not to create the impression that the ruling was a free pass to discriminate against homosexual consumers. Ultimately, the Court was of the opinion that forcing Ashers Baking Company to supply the requested cake would be a disproportionate limitation on the exercise of their rights to free speech and religion under Articles 9 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The decision of the UK Supreme Court comes not long after the US Supreme Court ruled in the case of Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 584 U.S. (2018
The issue of ‘gay cakes’ has become symbolic of a wider legal debate both in the United Kingdom and the United States on circumstances in which a business can refuse to serve a customer on the grounds of religious beliefs. The two recent judgments by the highest courts of both countries seem to tilt towards prioritising religious liberty over non-discrimination. It remains to be seen whether this will become a trend in both courts’ jurisprudence and to what degree their reasoning will overlap. Interestingly, in its ruling, the UK Supreme Court expressly relied on the approach taken by the US Supreme Court in its general First Amendment jurisprudence:
“The respondent suggests that the jurisprudence in relation to “compelled speech” has been developed principally in the United States as a result of the First Amendment. There is indeed longstanding Supreme Court authority for the proposition that “the right to freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all”: see Wooley v Maynard 430 US 705, 714, per Burger CJ, citing Board of Education v Barnette (1943) 319 US 624, 633-634. But in the light of Laramore and RT (Zimbabwe) , and the Strasbourg case law on which they are based, it cannot seriously be suggested that the same principles do not apply in the context of articles 9 and 10 of the Convention.” [at 53]
On other hand, and in somewhat usual manner, the Ashers Baking Company judgment of the UK Supreme Court contains a postscript where Lady Hale addresses the Masterpiece Cakeshop judgment of the US Supreme Court:
“After the hearing in this case, while this judgment was being prepared, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down judgment in Masterpiece Cakeshop Ltd v Colorado Civil Rights Commission (unreported) 4 June 2018. The facts are not the same. A Christian baker refused to create a wedding cake for a gay couple because of his opposition to same sex marriage. There is nothing in the reported facts to suggest that the couple wanted a particular message or decoration on their cake. The Colorado Civil Rights Commission, upheld by the Colorado courts, held that the baker had violated the Colorado law prohibiting businesses which offered sales or services to the public from discrimination based on sexual orientation. The baker complained that this violated his First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and the free exercise of his religion… The majority recognised that businesses could not generally refuse to supply products and services for gay weddings; but they acknowledged that the baker saw creating a wedding cake as an expressive statement involving his First Amendment rights; and contrasted the treatment that he had received, which they perceived as hostile, from the favourable treatment given to three bakers who had refused to produce cakes with messages demeaning gay persons and gay marriages. Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, in dissent, drew a clear distinction between an objection to the message on the cake and an objection to the customer who wanted the cake. The other bakery cases had been clear examples of an objection to the message rather than an objection to the customer. In their view the objection in this case was to the customer and therefore a violation. Justices Kagan and Breyer, who voted with the majority on the lack of neutrality point, also accepted that the Commission could have based its reasoning on that distinction – the other bakers would have refused to make cakes with the demeaning messages for anyone, whereas this baker had refused to make this cake because it was a gay couple who wanted it. Justices Thomas and Alito, on the other hand, considered that to make a cake for a gay wedding was expressive in itself and thus compelling it required strict scrutiny. Justice Gorsuch would also not have distinguished between a cake with words and a cake without. The important message from the Masterpiece Bakery case is that there is a clear distinction between refusing to produce a cake conveying a particular message, for any customer who wants such a cake, and refusing to produce a cake for the particular customer who wants it because of that customer’s characteristics. One can debate which side of the line particular factual scenarios fall. But in our case there can be no doubt. The bakery would have refused to supply this particular cake to anyone, whatever their personal characteristics. So there was no discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation. If and to the extent that there was discrimination on grounds of political opinion, no justification has been shown for the compelled speech which would be entailed for imposing civil liability for refusing to fulfil the order.” [at 59-62]
In any event, the inherent conflict between religious rights and the ban on discrimination will inevitably prompt similar cases in both the United Kingdom and the United States within the foreseeable future.
The swearing-in of Brett Kavanaugh as a new Associate Justice of the US Supreme Court replacing Justice Kennedy.
The next day Justice Kavanaugh had been confirmed to the Supreme Court, some Democrats called for his potential impeachment, should they flip the House of Representatives after the November mid-term elections (The Washington Post). Article II, Section 4 of the Constitution stipulates that “... all civil Officers of the United States shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and Misdemeanors“. Accordingly, the impeachment process has several elements. Firstly, the alleged wrongdoing must fall within the scope of an impeachable offence. Secondly, the House of Representatives must approve the Articles of Impeachment with a simple majority vote. Thirdly, the Senate must convict (i.e. removed from office) with at least 67 votes or otherwise the proceedings result in an automatic acquittal. Although a Justice of the Supreme Court (and any other federal Judge), as an Officer of the United States, is subject to impeachment, it is very unlikely that Justice Kavanaugh will be (successfully) impeached in any foreseeable future. First of all, it is not clear anyone could be impeached for any alleged wrongdoing taking place prior to the taking of the office. In Justice Kavanaugh’s case, most allegations were at least 30 years old therefore not in any manner connected with the office from which a successful impeachment would seek to remove him. Secondly, even if the Democrats win a majority in the House of Representatives in November, it is not clear they will have 218 House Members willing to vote in favour of the Articles of Impeachment, given how many of them would be coming from Red States supporting Justice Kavanaugh. Thirdly, even if the House votes to impeach, the impeachment will inevitably fail in the Senate given that the Constitution requires a two-thirds super majority to convict (i.e. remove) a person subject to the impeachment proceedings. As of now the Democrats do not even have a simple majority in the Senate and even if they manage to flip it in November, it will not amount to a two-thirds majority. From a purely legal point of view, raising the possibility of the impeachment of Justice Kavanaugh could not be taken seriously. This is even more so considering that no Justice of the Supreme Court has ever been removed from office by way of impeachment. In 1804 Justice Chase was impeached by the House of Representatives but a year later the impeachment failed in the Senate. In terms of lower courts Judges, only 14 have ever been impeached and of those only 8 have been actually removed from office by the Senate and an overwhelming majority of them on the grounds strictly related to their functions as a Judge, such as taking bribes or abuse of power (Federal Judicial Center). The possibility of impeachment by Congress is an extremely powerful tool which goes against the traditional separation of powers and therefore, by design, its use is severely restricted only to the most serious examples of the abuse of power.
On the night of 6 – 7 October Judge Kavanaugh was officially confirmed by a 51-49 majority of the US Senate as a new Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Republican Senator Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, who was considered a swing vote, voted ‘present’ therefore opposing the candidacy. Another Republican swing vote, Susan Collins of Maine, aligned with a Republican majority after a forceful defence of Judge Kavanaugh on the Senate floor the day before. The Republicans also picked up one Democrat, Joe Manchin of West Virginia who is facing a tough re-election fight in his deeply red state. The vote comes after weeks of investigations and hearings concerning sexual misconduct allegations against Judge Kavanaugh put forward by 3 different women, among which was that of Dr Christine Blasey Ford, which was a subject of a special Senate Judiciary Committee hearing (summary of allegations: Business Insider UK). In the last days of the process, many Senators saw protesters roaming the Senate halls demonstrating both their support and opposition to Judge Kavanaugh’s confirmation. This also included many examples of disorderly behaviour leading to hundreds protesters being arrested (The Guardian). The opposition to Judge Kavanaugh’s confirmation was based on a whole range of arguments, from those related to his judicial record, through the non-disclosure of old communication records, to those concerning sexual misconduct allegations and his short temper. On the other hand, the Republicans complained that the Democrats were adamant to derail the confirmation process with malicious behaviour from the start and none of their arguments had any merits. At the end of the day, however, Judge Kavanaugh has been dully confirmed and will now join the other 8 Justices of the Supreme Court who have already returned to work from their summer break.
The appointment of Judge Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court is bound to create a reliable originalist majority for the first time in almost 80 years, i.e. since Justice Owen Roberts abandoned the originalist approach in the case of West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) thereby ending the so called Lochner era in the Court’s jurisprudence. Although since 1937 the Court has seen periods with a majority composed of Republican-appointed Justices, they have not been consistently originalist in their judicial philosophies. It was the appointment of Justice Scalia to the bench by President Reagan in 1986 that brought the originalist philosophy back from the exile to the mainstream. Since then, other originalists have been appointed to the Court, including Justice Thomas (1991), Chief Justice Roberts (2005), Justice Alito (2006), Justice Gorsuch (2017) and now Justice Kavanaugh. Although the originalism of Chief Justice Roberts is admittedly less rigorous than that of Justice Thomas, and in the incoming years he might be even moving more towards the centre, it seems that the current Court is bound to be concerned with the original meaning of the Constitution more than at any other point within the last 80 years.
These changes to the composition of the Supreme Court will have a profound impact on a whole range of cases which are likely to reach the Court in this term. Firstly, on the subject of the 2nd Amendment, the Court might be asked to decide what types of firearms are covered by the 2nd Amendment and whether the Amendment applies to all public spaces in addition to one’s home. In this respect there appears to be a circuit split between the 9th and the 7th Circuit Courts of Appeals (Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 939 (2016) v Moore v Madigan (USDC 11-CV-405-WDS, 11-CV-03134; 7th Cir. 12-1269, 12-1788)). Secondly, on the never-ending issue of ObamaCare, the Court will likely be asked to resolve the question whether the ObamaCare’s Individual Mandate (and possibly other parts of the statute with it) has been rendered unconstitutional by The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 2017 which eliminated the tax/penalty for not complying with it. At this point, several Red States are suing claiming that the elimination of the tax has rendered the Individual Mandate unconstitutional as now, in the absence of any tax attached to it, it could only be construed as an exercise of the Congress’s power to regulate inter-state commerce which was already declared invalid by the US Supreme Court in its famous 2012 case (Texas Tribune). However, the lawsuit goes even further and claims that the Individual Mandate is inseverable from the rest of the law, or at least from its certain parts, such as the community rating, and if it is in fact struck down by the Court, it might drag other parts of the ObamaCare with it. Given that the Trump Administration decided not to defend the lawsuit, the case is now bound to proceed further up the ladder towards the Supreme Court (The Atlantic). Thirdly, the Court might be asked to rule whether the DACA programme (and its rescission via executive action) is constitutional. The Trump Administration announced in 2017 that it would rescind the DACA programme altogether as incompatible with federal immigration laws on the books. However, on 3 August 2018, a DC District Court ruled in the case of Trustees of Princeton University v United States (1:17-cv-02325-JDB) that the rescission of DACA was unlawful because the Administration did not supply the Court with any valid reason for its decision. Now an appeal in this case is expected by the Trump Administration. Fourthly, also on the immigration subject, the Court might be asked to finally resolve the question of the legality of the so called sanctuary cities. In 2017 the Department of Justice decided to withdraw funding from cities refusing to cooperate with the federal government in respect of immigration enforcement and in March 2018 it sued the State of California for its sanctuary policies. On the other hand, in return, two of California counties sued the Department of Justice claiming that such a withdrawal of funds was unconstitutional and persuaded a local District Court as well as the Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit to grant an injunction (The Washington Post). Fifthly, the Court is likely to be asked again to rule on the constitutionality of affirmative action as last decisions on this subject have been extremely closely decided with Justice Kennedy always casting the deciding vote. So far there is no case pending before any federal court concerning affirmative action, however, there have been some moves by the Trump Administration to limits its impact, such as reversing President Obama’s policy on affirmative action in schools (NY Times) or investigating the impact of affirmative action programmes at the Harvard University on the Asian-American minority admissions (CNN). Finally, the Court will most likely, again, deal with abortion. On 4 May 2018 the State of Iowa passed into law in the so called ‘heartbeat’ Act banning abortions as soon as fetal heartbeat could be detected, which usually happens around the sixth week into pregnancy, which now constitutes the most restrictive abortion law in the country. Immediately, the American Civil Liberties Union sued in the Polk County District Court for a declaration of unconstitutionality as well as an interim injunction against the law which was granted on 1 June 2018 (Des Moines Register). The case is now being considered on its merits but regardless of the Court’s decision, it is bound to be appealed and eventually end up before the Supreme Court. Overall, given the multitude of important issues which await consideration by the US Supreme Court, the new originalist majority of the Court might leave a unique legacy for decades to come.
The judgment of the UK Supreme Court In the matter of an application by Siobhan McLaughlin for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland)  UKSC 48.
The swearing-in ceremony for Lady Arden and Lord Kitchin as new Justices of the UK Supreme Court.
At the end of August 2018, the UK Supreme Court ruled In the matter of an application by Siobhan McLaughlin for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland)  UKSC 48 that the current rules for the payment of Widowed Parent’s Allowance (WPA) violated Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights read in conjunction with Article 14. WPA is a contributory-based social benefit offered under s39A of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits (Northern Ireland) Act 1992 to widowed parents with dependent children whose spouse or civil partner has died. The Court ruled that the requirement of a formal marriage or civil partnership as a precondition for receiving WPA discriminated against couples who although had children together, never formalised their relationship.
The Court was however cautious to say that not every type of social benefit requiring a formal union is necessarily incompatible with the Convention. It was held that WPA could not be dependent on the prior existence of marriage or civil partnership because it was designed to benefit children who have lost one of their parents rather than to make any form of compensation to the surviving parent him or herself. Accordingly, to condition the payment of WPA on the existence of a formal union between parents is to effectively discriminate between the so called legitimate and illegitimate children – a policy which was declared unlawful by the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Marckx v Belgium (App. no.: 6833/74), back in 1979. It is on this basis that the Lady Hale, writing for the majority, attempted to distinguish the case of Shackell v United Kingdom (App. No.: 45851/99) where the European Court of Human Rights had held inadmissible complaints that the lack of a formal marriage should not deprive the surviving widow of an analogous benefit (paras. 25-28). The attempt was nevertheless not entirely convincing and Lord Mance in his Concurring Opinion (with which Lady Hale agreed) further elaborated on this point ultimately considering the reasoning in Shackell to be simply unsatisfactory (para. 49).
This approach of the majority however prompted Lorde Hodge to claim, in his Dissenting Opinion, that the majority was departing from a settled line of case law of the European Court of Human Rights which had recently been confirmed in the case of Burden v United Kingdom (App. no.: 13378/05). Moreover, Lord Hodge pointed out that although the WPA could be construed as designed to ultimately benefit children, it was nevertheless payable directly to the surviving spouse and depended heavily on his or her circumstances so that “if she remarries or enters into a civil partnership, so long as she cohabits with a partner of either gender, or if she dies, the WPA ceases to be payable” and “the sums payable to the Survivor are not related to the children’s needs or increased by reference to the number of children for whom she is responsible.” (paras. 76-78). At the end of the day, the UK Supreme Court under the presidency of Lady Hale again took an active approach to the protection guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights.
President Trump has made clear on several occasions that judicial nominations are one of his top priorities. In terms of Appeal Courts, as of 15 September 2018, he has successfully appointed 26 Circuit Judges, with further 10 nominations pending before the Senate and another 3 positions awaiting his nomination (13 vacancies in total). Many commentators have been pointing out that President Trump might not only change the constitution of the US Supreme Court by appointing Judge Gorsuch (and most likely Judge Kavanaugh) to its bench, but also flip majorities of at least some Appeal Circuits. However, upon a closer examination, this seems rather unlikely, at least in President Trump’s first term in office.
The US Courts of Appeals are grouped in 11 Circuits in addition to the so called special DC Circuit. As of 15 September 2018, the 1st Circuit is the only one which has not had any vacancies since the last general election and as such it has a stable 4-2 Democratic majority. The 2nd Circuit has 3 vacancies but even if filled by President Trump, it will retain a Democratic majority of 7-6. The 3rd Circuit has 2 vacancies and it has already seen 1 judge appointed to its bench by President Trump in addition to 4 judges appointed by previous Republican Presidents so assuming President Trump fills those 2 empty seats, the Circuit will be evenly split 7-7 between the Republican and Democratic appointees. The 4th Circuit has also had 2 judges appointed to its bench by President Trump on top of 4 judges appointed by previous Republican Presidents but it retains a stable Democratic majority of 8-6. The 5th Circuit currently has 1 vacancy, 5 Trump appointees and 6 other Republican-appointed judges making its overwhelmingly Republican 12-5. The 6th Circuit is also overwhelmingly Republican with 4 Trump appointees on top of 7 other Republican-appointed judges adding up to a strong 11-5 Republican majority. The situation is similar in the 7th Circuit which has 4 Trump appointees in addition to other 5 judges appointed by previous Republican Presidents adding up to a stable 9-2 Republican majority. This is again seen in the 8th Circuit where President Trump has appointed 3 judges on top of 7 other Republican-appointed judges adding up to an overwhelming Republican majority of 10-1. The most liberal of all the Circuits, the famous 9th Circuit currently has 7 vacancies, 1 Trump appointee and another 5 Republican-appointed judges but even assuming all those vacancies are filled by President Trump, the Circuit will nevertheless retain a stable Democratic majority of 16-13. A stable Democratic majority of 7-5 will also hold in the 10th Circuit where President Trump has appointed 2 judges on top of another 3 appointed by previous Republican Presidents. The 11th Circuit is another Circuit which is evenly split 6-6 between the Democratic and Republican appointees after President Trump has appointed 3 judges in addition to another 3 Republican-appointed judges already on the bench. Finally, the DC Circuit consisting of 1 Trump appointee and 3 other Republican-appointed judges also retains a stable Democratic majority of 7-4.
Given the structure of vacancies inherited by President Trump, it is unlikely that his appointments will be able to flip any Appeal Circuit. As of 15 September 2018, despite any appointments made so far, and any other likely to be made in President Trump’s first term, Democratic-appointed judges hold majorities in 6 Circuits (1st, 2nd, 4th, 9th, 10th and the DC Circuit) and Republican-appointed judges hold majorities in 4 Circuits (5th, 6th, 7th and 8th). The only difference made by President Trump’s appointments to the Appeal Courts could be observed in the 3rd and 11th Circuits which moved from stable Democratic majorities to being evenly split. In any event, with the appointment of Judge Gorsuch and the likely appointment of Judge Kavanaugh to the US Supreme Court, it is not the Appeal Courts where President Trump intends to make his judicial legacy most visible.
On 13 September 2018, the European Court of Human Rights issued its ruling in the case of Big Brother Watch v UK (App. Nos.: 58170/13, 62322/14 & 24960/15) concerning 3 types of British surveillance programmes:
(1) The collection of metadata by the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) under the programme codenamed ‘TEMPORA’ under Section 8 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA);
(2) The accessing of communication data retained by Communications Service Providers (CSPs) by various public authorities under Chapter II of RIPA and Part 4 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA);
(3) The accessing of metadata collected by the American National Security Agency (NSA) under the programmes codenamed ‘PRISM’ and ‘UPSTREAM’ by GCHQ.
The existence of all those programmes was revealed by Edward Snoweden in 2013 and immediately prompted litigation both in the United States as well as in the United States (see e.g. American Civil Liberties Union v. James Clapper, No. 13-3994 (S.D. New York December 28, 2013) & Klayman v. Obama (13-cv-881)).
In its 212-page-long opinion, the European Court of Human Rights held that the collection of metadata by the GCHQ under the programme codenamed ‘TEMPORA’ under Section 8 of RIPA violated Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights:
“387 . In light of the foregoing considerations, the Court considers that the decision to operate a bulk interception regime was one which fell within the wide margin of appreciation afforded to the Contracting State. Furthermore, in view of the independent oversight provided by the Interception of Communications Commissioner and the IPT, and the extensive independent investigations which followed the Edward Snowden revelations, it is satisfied that the intelligence services of the United Kingdom take their Convention obligations seriously and are not abusing their powers under section 8(4) of RIPA. Nevertheless, an examination of those powers has identified two principal areas of concern; first, the lack of oversight of the entire selection process, including the selection of bearers for interception, the selectors and search criteria for filtering intercepted communications, and the selection of material for examination by an analyst; and secondly, the absence of any real safeguards applicable to the selection of related communications data for examination.
388. In view of these shortcomings and to the extent just outlined, the Court finds that the section 8(4) regime does not meet the “quality of law” requirement and is incapable of keeping the “interference” to what is “necessary in a democratic society”. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.
495. Nevertheless, in view of the potential chilling effect that any perceived interference with the confidentiality of their communications and, in particular, their sources might have on the freedom of the press and, in the absence of any “above the waterline” arrangements limiting the intelligence services’ ability to search and examine such material other than where “it is justified by an overriding requirement in the public interest”, the Court finds that there has also been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.”
Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the accessing of communication data retained by Communications Service Providers (CSPs) by various public authorities under Chapter II of RIPA and Part IV of IPA also violated Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention as it constituted an interference which was not ‘in accordance with law’. This part of the judgment reflects an earlier finding of the High Court in the case of Liberty v Secretary of State for the Home Department  EWHC 975 (Admin) and the Court of Justice of the European Union:
“463 . The Court of Justice of the European Union has also addressed this issue. In Digital Rights Ireland v. Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and Others and Settinger and Others (Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12), the CJEU considered the validity of the Data Retention Directive, and in Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Watson and Others (C-698/15), the validity of domestic legislation containing the same provisions as that directive (see paragraphs 224 – 234 above). While its focus was on the retention of data by CSPs, it also considered the question of access to retained data by the national authorities. In doing so, it indicated that access should be limited to what was strictly necessary for the objective pursued and, where that objective was fighting crime, it should be restricted to fighting serious crime. It further suggested that access should be subject to prior review by a court or independent administrative authority, and that there should be a requirement that the data concerned be retained within the European Union. In light of the CJEU’s findings, Liberty sought to challenge Part 4 of the IPA, which included a power to issue “retention notices” to telecommunications operators requiring the retention of data. In response, the Government conceded that Part 4 was incompatible with fundamental rights in EU law since access to retained data was not limited to the purpose of combating “serious crime”; and access to retained data was not subject to prior review by a court or an independent administrative body. The High Court held that the legislation had to be amended by 1 November 2018 (see paragraph 196 above).”
At the same time, the European Court of Human Rights held that the accessing of metadata originally collected by the American NSA under the programmes codenamed PRISM and UPSTREAM by the GCHQ did not violate any Convention rights:
“447. In light of the foregoing considerations, the Court considers that the domestic law, together with the clarifications brought by the amendment of the IC Code, indicate with sufficient clarity the procedure for requesting either interception or the conveyance of intercept material from foreign intelligence agencies. In this regard, it observes that the high threshold recommended by the Venice Commission -� namely, that the material transferred should only be able to be searched if all the material requirements of a national search were fulfilled and this was duly authorised in the same way as a search of bulk material obtained by the signals intelligence agency using its own techniques -� is met by the respondent State’s regime. The Court further observes that there is no evidence of any significant shortcomings in the application and operation of the regime. On the contrary, following an investigation the ISC found no evidence whatsoever of abuse.”
In any event, it must be noted that the ruling was concerned with the surveillance scheme under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 which has since been replaced to a large degree by a different scheme under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. According to the Government, the new scheme “includes the introduction of a ‘double lock’ which requires warrants for the use of these powers to be authorised by a secretary of state and approved by a judge. An investigatory powers commissioner has also been created to ensure robust independent oversight of how these powers are used. The government will give careful consideration to the court’s findings.” (GOV.UK). However, as mentioned earlier, the 2016 Act itself had already been declared unlawful in part (Liberty v Secretary of State for the Home Department  EWHC 975 (Admin)) thereby leaving the question of its overall legality open.
Between 5 and 7 September 2018, the Senate Judiciary Committee held confirmation hearings for the Supreme Court nominee Judge Kavanaugh. The Committee composed of 21 members (10 Democrats and 11 Republicans) questioned Judge Kavanaugh on his judicial record and philosophy. As expected, it was a hugely contentious hearing with constant shouts from the audience leading to multiple arrests and Democratic Senators attacking the nominee’s credibility and independence. However, after 3 long days, Judge Kavanaugh came out of the hearings without any significant blunder. Most of the time he followed the so called Ginsburg Rule declining to answer any question concerning any legal issue which could possibly come before the Court. Perhaps most crucially, Judge Kavanaugh also described Roe v Wade as an ‘important precedent’ therefore making it possible for the 2 pro-choice Republican Senators Lisa Murkowsky of Alaska and Susan Collins of Maine to support his nomination. The 2 Senators are considered the swing votes in the upcoming confirmation vote given that the Republicans need all their Senators to vote yes, assuming the vote would go down along the party lines, which is likely. Now that Judge Kavanaugh has not raised any red flags for any Republican Senator, he is likely to be confirmed by the Senate by the end of September so that he can join the Court by 01 October when its term starts.
The confirmation of Judge Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court will indeed be a historical moment. For the first time in almost 80 years the US Supreme Court will have a reliable originalist majority. The last time there was an originalist majority on the Court was prior to the so called ‘switch in time that saved nine’, i.e., before Justice Owen Roberts abandoned the originalist approach in the case of West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) thereby ending the so called Lochner era in the Court’s jurisprudence. For the next 80 years the Court will almost consistently decide cases coming before it based on the premise that the US Constitution is a living document whose meaning changes over time. Now all this is about to change. This, of course, does not mean that the Court will suddenly start overruling 80 years of precedents. However, given how much is at stake, it is no surprise the liberal forces are very anxious about their legacy.
Day 3 of Judge Kavanaugh Confirmation Hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee.
Day 2 of Judge Kavanaugh Confirmation Hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee.
Day 1 of Judge Kavanaugh Confirmation Hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee.
While the US Supreme Court is in recess now, there are several potentially monumental cases which are either being processed in lower Courts at the moment or are likely to end up before the federal courts soon, which are due to eventually bubble up during the high court’s next term. As the Court reconvenes in October 2018, it will also most likely have a new member, Judge Kavanaugh, whom the Senate Republicans plan to confirm in September 2018 thereby consolidating a solid conservative majority on the bench. The Supreme Court so constituted, will face requests to adjudicate on a whole series of tough issues, some of which are now long overdue.
Here is a list of 6 big questions the US Supreme Court might be asked to answer during its next term:
1. Whether the 2nd Amendment Protects the Right to Bear Arms outside One’s Home
In its landmark 2008 opinion, the US Supreme Court ruled in District of Columbia v. Heller (554 U.S. 570 2008) that the 2nd Amendment protected the individual right to possess firearms within the confines of one’s home for the purposes of self-defence. In 2010 the rule was extended in McDonald v. Chicago (561 U.S. 742 2010) to apply to States as well. However, since then, the Court has taken very few cases concerning the scope of the 2nd Amendment (but see e.g. Caetano v. Massachusetts, 577 U.S. ___ (2016)). This leaves two big issues largely unresolved. First, what types of firearms are covered by the 2nd Amendment? Secondly, does the 2nd Amendment cover public arena outside of one’s home? Both issues are hotly litigated over, especially in the so called Blue States. On 24 July 2018 a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit ruled in the case of Young v State of Hawaii No. 12-17808 that the 2nd Amendment did in fact protect the right to bear arms in public. This is in spite of the 2016 decision of the same Court in Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 939 (2016), which, sitting en banc, upheld a complete ban on carrying any firearms outside one’s home. However, the latter case was distinguished on the grounds that it was concerned with a concealed-carry while the former was concerned with an open-carry. Nevertheless, the State of Hawaii is entitled to apply for a reconsideration of this decision by an en banc Court which, given a strong liberal nature of the 9th Circuit, is likely to result in a reversal of the original decision. Regardless, the 2nd Amendment jurisprudence of the 9th Circuit stands in open opposition to other Circuits, such as the 7th Circuit which held in 2013 in the case of Moore v Madigan (USDC 11-CV-405-WDS, 11-CV-03134; 7th Cir. 12-1269, 12-1788) that a complete ban on concealed carry was unconstitutional. This situation constitutes a clear example of the so called ‘circuit split’ which creates a pressure on the Supreme Court to resolve the issue rather sooner than later. Here the appointment of Judge Kavanaugh as a new Supreme Court Justice might be of considerable impact as he has a strong record on the 2nd Amendment (e.g. Heller v. District of Columbia No. 10–7036. 2011).
2. Whether the ObamaCare’s Individual Mandate Has Been Rendered Unconstitutional by The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 2017
So far the ObamaCare has withstood, albeit not in its entirety, several challenges before the federal courts and a new one is gaining momentum now. In 2012 the US Supreme Court ruled in the case of National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (567 U.S. 519 2012) that, inter alia, although the Individual Mandate was not a valid exercise of the Congress’s power to regulate inter-state commerce, it could be read as a tax and thereby be a valid exercise of the taxation power instead. This is because the so called ‘penalty’ for breaching the Mandate was limited to a financial fee processed by the IRS together with individuals’ income taxes. This saving construction persuaded Chief Justice Roberts who joined the 4 liberal Justices on the Court and voted to uphold the Individual Mandate. However, The Tax and Jobs Act 2017 recently passed by Congress eliminates this so called tax while leaving the Individual Mandate as such intact. In those circumstances, several Red States sued again claiming that the elimination of the tax had rendered the Individual Mandate unconstitutional as now, in the absence of any tax attached to it, it could only be construed as an exercise of the Congress’s power to regulate inter-state commerce which was already declared invalid by the US Supreme Court in 2012 (Texas Tribune). However, the lawsuit goes even further as it claims that the Individual Mandate is inseverable from the rest of the law or at least from its certain parts, such as the community rating, and if it is in fact struck down by the Court, it might drag other parts of the ObamaCare with it. Given that the Trump Administration decided not to defend the lawsuit, the case is now bound to proceed further up the ladder towards the Supreme Court (The Atlantic). Interestingly, the replacement of Justice Kennedy with Judge Kavanugh might actually push the Court to reject any challenges to the ObamaCare as Judge Kavanaugh appears to have been more accommodating in this respect than his predecessor, siding with the approach of the Chief Justice rather than Justice Scalia (Seven-Sky v. Holder (No. 11–5047 2011)).
3. Whether the DACA Program (and its Rescission via Executive Action) is Constitutional
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) was announced by President Obama via an Executive Memorandum in 2012 to allow for a temporary lawful stay of illegal immigrants brought to the United States as children. The policy was introduced in response to Congress not being able to pass the DREAM Act which would put it on a statutory footing. Since then, DACA has been often cited as an example of executive overreach given that it was introduced via executive action thereby circumventing the legislature. The policy has been challenged in the federal courts several times. A lawsuit against the original policy was dismissed on procedural grounds in 2013 (Fox News) but as President Obama attempted to extend the programme, the expansion was blocked by the US Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Texas, 579 U.S. ___ (2016), although in a per curiam decision concerning an interim injunction with the crux of the matter soon becoming moot. The Trump Administration announced in 2017 that it would rescind the DACA program altogether as incompatible with federal immigration laws on the books. However, on 3 August 2018, a DC District Court ruled in the case of Trustees of Princeton University v United States (1:17-cv-02325-JDB) that the rescission of DACA was unlawful because the Administration did not supply the Court with any valid reason for its decision. This is yet another signature policy of the Trump Administration after the so called Travel Ban blocked by lower federal courts and therefore the decision is bound to be appealed by the Administration in hope that the US Supreme Court will vindicate its lawfulness, as it happened in the Travel Ban case (Trump v. Hawaii, No. 17-965, 585 U.S. ___ (2018)). In this area the impact of the appointment of Judge Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court is rather difficult to predict.
4. Whether the Policy of Sanctuary Cities is Constitutional
The question of the constitutionality of sanctuary polices has been looming for decades but so far it has never been properly decided. This, however, might change now that the Trump Administration vowed to crack down on Blue States shielding illegal immigrants from federal agencies. On the one hand, the Department of Justice decided to withdraw funding from cities refusing to cooperate with the federal government in respect of immigration enforcement and in March 2018 it sued the State of California for its sanctuary policies. On the other hand, in return, two of California counties (San Francisco and Santa Clara) sued the Department of Justice claiming that such a withdrawal of funds was unconstitutional and managed even to persuade a local District Court as well as the Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit to grant an injunction (The Washington Post). Accordingly, given how high this issue is on the Presidential agenda and how much litigation it has generated so far, one of those cases is bound to end up before the US Supreme Court sooner or later and this time the Court will have no choice but to rule on a wider issue of sanctuary policies in general. As with the DACA programme, the impact of the appointment of Judge Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court on sanctuary policies is not easy to predict.
5. Whether Affirmative Action is Constitutional
Technically, the constitutionality of affirmative action has already been confirmed on several occasions, for the first time in 1978 in the case of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (438 U.S. 265 1978), then in 2003 in Grutter v. Bollinger (539 U.S. 306 2003) and most recently in 2016 in the case of Fisher v. University of Texas (579 U.S. (2016), commonly referred to as Fisher II. However, the recent decisions have been extremely closely decided and Justice Kennedy has been the one casting the deciding vote. Now that Justice Kennedy is being replaced by Judge Kavanaugh, the Court might easily swing the other way. So far there is no case pending before any federal court concerning affirmative action, however, there have been some moves by the Trump Administration to limits its impact, such as reversing President Obama’s policy on affirmative action in schools (NY Times) or investigating the impact of affirmative action programmes at the Harvard University on the Asian-American minority admissions (CNN). Although no case has been brought on this issue so far, there are signs that affirmative action might once again end up before the federal courts and this time Justice Kennedy will not be around to save it.
6. Whether Fetal Heartbeat Legislation is Constitutional
The opposition of Red States to the constitutional right to abortion recognised in Roe v Wade (1973) is widely known. From time, to time, this opposition materliases in a form of some State legislation hindering access to abortion in hope that it would pass the Undue Burden test imposed on this type of legislation by the Supreme Court in the case of Planned Parenthood v Casey (1992). One of such measures was passed and signed into law in the State of Iowa on 4 May 2018. The so called ‘heartbeat’ Act bans abortions as soon as fetal heartbeat could be detected, which usually happens around the sixth week into pregnancy, and as such constitutes the most restrictive abortion law in the country. Immediately, the American Civil Liberties Union sued in the Polk County District Court for a declaration of unconstitutionality as well as an interim injunction against the law which was granted on 1 June 2018 (Des Moines Register). The case is now being considered on its merits but regardless of the Court’s decision, it is bound to be appealed and eventually end up before the US Supreme Court. This is especially interesting given that Judge Kavanaugh’s jurisprudence on abortion is very scarce and no one is able to predict how he might vote on this issue. If the newest Justice decides to side with the reliable conservatives on the Court, the fate of the right to abortion in the United States will depend solely on Chief Justice Roberts and he remains a huge unknown as well.
It seems that in its 2019 term, the US Supreme Court might be asked to decide at least 6 issues of historical importance and its decisions will be felt across the whole country in decades to come.
A list of helpful or interesting legal websites and blogs:
SCOTUS Blog – a comprehensive US Supreme Court news coverage and commentary.
Above The Law – takes a behind-the-scenes look at the world of law.
UKSC Blog – a law blog dedicated to the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom.
UK Human Rights Blog – a blog aiming to provide a free, comprehensive and balanced legal update service.
UK Constitutional Law Association Blog – news and commentary on constitutional law of the United Kingdom.
European Law Blog – a blog aiming to provide a range of interesting analyses of and ideas on EU law.
Legal Cheek – news & gossip, cheeky commentary and careers advice.
BAILII – a free website where you can find British and Irish case law & legislation, European Union case law, Law Commission reports, and other law-related British and Irish material.
HUDOC – free database of case law and press updates from the European Court of Human Rights.
As the US Supreme Court has gone to recess, Justice Ginsburg summarises the last term.
On 30 July 2018, the UK Supreme Court ruled, in the case of NHS Trust v Y (by his litigation friend, the Official Solicitor)  UKSC 46, that not all decisions concerning a withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment require the Courts’ approval. Unlike euthanasia or assisted dying, neither of which is legal in the United Kingdom (Suicide Act 1961,s 2), a withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from a patient in a vegetative state is treated as an omission (as opposed to an ‘act’) conducted in the best interest of the patient and therefore does not incur any criminal liability (Airedale NHS Trust v Bland  1 All ER 821 HL). Up until now, however, any such decision was believed to require a declaration from a Court, usually the Court of Protection, that the withdrawal of treatment resulting in death would be lawful. In its opinion, the UK Supreme Court concludes now that such a procedure is only required where there is no agreement between the doctors and the family as to the withdrawal of treatment but where such an agreement has already been reached, no separate approval from any Court is needed.
In the recent years, there have been several attempts to legalise assisted dying in the United Kingdom, both through legislation and various Courts’ cases. However, in the 2014 case of R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice  UKSC 38), the UK Supreme Court refused to recognise the right to assisted dying under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights basing its decision on the 2002 ruling by the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Pretty v. United Kingdom (App. No.: 2346/02) and Lord Falconer’s Assisted Dying Bill was defeated in Parliament in 2015 (BBC). The decision in NHS Trust v Y does not change the status of assisted dying in the United Kingdom but it does remove most of life-death decisions from the immediate supervision of the Courts, at least where both the patient’s doctors and family members agree to withdraw the treatment. This decision should relieve the Courts from a considerable chunk of their workload in the area of medical treatment applications while at the same time reinforce the rights of family members of patients in a vegetative state by allowing them to make those critical decisions in the privacy of hospital rooms, without any state interference.
The Judgment of the UK Supreme Court in the case of NHS Trust v Y (by his litigation friend, the Official Solicitor)  UKSC 46 concerning the requirement to obtain Court’s approval before withdrawing a life-sustaining treatment from patients in vegetative state.
On 29 July 2018, Justice Ginsburg, who is currently 85 years old
declared that she planned to remain on the Supreme Court for at least 5 more years (The Guardian). The Justice is already the oldest sitting Justice of the Court. She was originally appointed by President Clinton in 1993 at the age of 60 as the second woman ever appointed to the US Supreme Court. She is a known liberal who openly opposed the candidacy of Donald Trump during the 2016 presidential election (CNN). In fact, it is common knowledge that Justice Ginsburg will not voluntarily retire during a Republican president. Given her age, she was pressured to retire during the second term of the Obama’s presidency in case his predecessor turned out to be a Republican but she did not cave (e.g. NY Times here). Now that President Trump appoints strictly conservative judges to the federal benches, Justice Ginsburg embraces herself to wait out his term in office. During the next presidential election in 2020, the Justice will be 87 but her retirement plans will necessarily depend on whether President Trump is re-elected or not. If President Trump wins again in 2020, Justice Ginsburg will have no choice but to endure yet another 4 years on the bench. If successful, this would bring her to over 91 thereby beating the current record-holder, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who stepped down at the age of 90 years and 10 months. She would also beat her former colleague Justice John Paul Stevens, who retired in 2010 at the age of 90 years and 2 months. Justice Ginsburg, despite her history of cancer and regular nodding-off during official events, remains active both as an opinion writer on the bench as well as a public speaker outside the Court. Given her spirit, she might as well be capable of achieving the title of the oldest ever sitting Justice of the US Supreme Court, that is provided nothing unexpected happens of course.
On 27 June 2018, the UK Supreme Court ruled unanimously, in the case of R (on the application of Steinfeld and Keidan) v Secretary of State for International Development (in substitution for the Home Secretary and the Education Secretary), that the unavailability of civil partnerships to heterosexual couples was incompatible with Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights read in conjunction with Article 8. The Civil Partnership Act 2004 was introduced by the Labour Government to offer some form of formalised unions to homosexual couples at the time when British society was not ready for ‘gay marriage.’ Since it was designed to introduce formal relationships akin to marriage, the Act expressly applied to same-sex couples only as heterosexual couples could enter into actual marriage instead. This rationale was justified so long as same-sex couples could not marry. But this changed with the introduction of the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013. Since then, homosexual couples have been able to choose between civil partnership and actual marriage while heterosexual couples could only marry. This has been challenged as a form of direct discrimination based on sexual orientation contrary to Article 14 of the Convention as applied by virtue of Article 8. Now the UK Supreme Court held that the need to “wait and evaluate” before enacting any reform, an argument the Government put forward to justify the discrimination, does not, in this case, constitute a legitimate aim under the Convention as this is not an instance of a discrimination with a long tradition which is only gradually becoming unacceptable but rather a novel issue whose discriminatory nature was apparent as soon as it was introduced (paras. 42-43). At the end, the Court did not hesitate to issue a declaration of incompatibility explaining that absent any legitimate aim, deference to a parliamentary process is not justified (paras. 54-57). The ruling goes a step further than the hitherto jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights which held in 2013, in the case of Vallianatos v Greece (App. Nos.: 29381/09 and 32684/09), that the availability of civil partnerships to heterosexual couples only violated Article 14 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 8 because homosexual couples were not in a ‘comparable situation’ as they could neither marry nor enter into civil unions while heterosexual couples could do both (paras. 78-79). The same, however, could not be said about the situation of heterosexual couples in the United Kingdom. Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights ruled, in April 2018, in the case of Ratzenbock and Seydl v Austria (App. No.: 28475/12), that the unavailability of civil partnerships to heterosexual couples did not violate the Convention given that they could enter into marriage while same-sex couples could not. The Court was of the opinion that “the institutions of marriage and the registered partnership are essentially complementary in Austrian law.” (para. 40) – the same state of affairs one could observed in the UK between 2004 and 2013 but not since then. Accordingly, the judgment of the UK Supreme Court appears to have been built on the existing jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights while shrinking any deference to the legislature within the presumed margin of appreciation. Now it is only a matter of time before Parliament amended the Civil Partnership Act to remedy the injustice.
On 24 July 2018, the European Court of Human Rights found, in the case of ZG v. Hungary (App. No.: 65858/13), that the state’s ‘severance tax’ of 98% violated the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of property under Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the Convention. This case marks the tenth time this year the Court adjudicated on the same issue with the same effect. The line of cases dates back to the summer of 2013 when, in the cases of N.K.M. v. Hungary (App. No.: 66529/11) and R.Sz. v. Hungary (App. No.: 41838/11), the Court ruled that the 98% tax on severance payments for public employees did not strike a fair balance “between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights” (para. 49) – a requirement which the Court read into Section 1 of Article 1. This is despite the clear wording of Section 2 of the same Article stipulating that “the preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State … to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” This line of cases is remarkable as nowhere else has the European Court of Human Rights held a tax incompatible with the Convention solely for the reason of its rate. Although the Court was also concerned with the fact that the tax was levied on the payment which was contractually guaranteed when the employee was undertaking the employment, this could be said about any new tax, as any new tax is necessarily levied, to a certain degree, on a state of affairs which has already been initiated. Furthermore, even though the Court indicated that in different circumstances such a high tax rate might be allowed, nevertheless, it seems that the European Court of Human Rights has, with this line of cases, brought taxation rates within the ambit of the Convention rendering them fully reviewable. This move widens considerably the protection of private property under the Convention, which, as originally enacted in Protocol 1, was rather weak. If a severance tax can be held incompatible with the Convention based on its high rate, there is nothing stopping the Court from holding any other type of taxation, including an income tax, to be equally incompatible. Of course the Court remains cautious in this respect granting Member States the highest level of margin of appreciation, nevertheless, by maintaining its ‘severance tax’ jurisprudence, it sends a strong message that extraordinarily high taxes levied with no apparent justification are not beyond the Court’s jurisdiction.
Northern Ireland has one of the strictest abortion laws in Europe. It also differs from the rest of the United Kingdom where abortion is easily accessible under the Abortion Act 1967. But Northern Irish women can only access abortion where the mother’s life or health is in danger. This has recently been challenged by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission as incompatible with Article 8 and Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In 2015 the Commission won a surprising victory at the Northern Irish High Court ( NIQB 96) where the Court held that Northern Irish law failed to strike a fair balance between the right of the mother to private life guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention and the need to protect the life of the foetus, in cases of pregnancy resulting from sexual crimes (prior to the point of viability) and foetus deformity (throughout the pregnancy). But this ruling was subsequently overruled by the Northern Irish Court of Appeal ( NICA 42). Finally, on 7 June 2018, In the matter of an application by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland), the UK Supreme Court ruled 4-3 that the Commission had no legal standing to bring the case in the first place and therefore the original ruling was void. However, at the same time, and somewhat unusual, it was held that had there been jurisdiction, the Court would have found the current Northern Irish abortion law incompatible with Article 8 of the Convention in cases of rape and incest (4-3 vote) and fatal foetal abnormality (5-2 vote).
This line of cases dating back to 2015 is extraordinary for at least three reasons. Firstly, the European Court of Human Rights has never found that strict abortion laws comparable to Northern Irish statutes, as a matter of substance, violate any Article of the European Convention on Human Rights, even when it was expressly invited to do so in A, B, C v Ireland (2011). For a domestic Court to find a violation of any Convention right in this situation is to curtail a wide margin of appreciation given to states by the European Court of Human Rights in relation to abortion regulations, at the expense of the legislature. Secondly, Northern Irish society is known to be extremely prone to social unrest and given how controversial the abortion debate is, the Courts have shown real courage by stepping into this debate so decisively. Thirdly, even though the case was ultimately thrown out on procedural grounds, the UK Supreme Court has sent a clear message that the Northern Irish abortion law must be liberalised as it considered it incompatible with the Convention. It is inconceivable that this unequivocal message could be ignored and as such, it is now a matter of time before Northern Irish abortion laws undergo a deep reform.
With the nomination of Judge Kavanaugh for Justice Kennedy’s seat at the Supreme Court, some commentators raised the issue of President Trump rapidly transforming the Federal Courts by appointing a record number of District and Circuit Court Judges (e.g The Guardian here and here). This claim is based mostly on the fact that a record number of such Judges have been appointed in President Trump’s first 1,5 years in the office comparing with previous Presidents (e.g. The Hill here). In as much as this is probably true, the claim that President Trump will appoint an unprecedented number of lower Courts Judges is rather misleading. As of 25 July 2018, President Trump has nominated 137 Judges of the so called Article III Courts (USCourts.gov). Although this seems like a high number for only 1,5 years into the presidency, so far the US Senate has confirmed only 44 of those 137 nominations (including 1 Justice of the Supreme Court, 23 Judges for the United States Courts of Appeals and 20 Judges for the United States District Courts). This is still claimed to be one of the highest numbers for any presidency after only 1,5 years. However, even if this pace is maintained, and President Trump is re-elected in 2020, he will have only appointed around 234 Judges throughout his two terms. This is not even close to his predecessor, President Obama, who appointed 308 Judges between 2008 and 2016. It is also far from the three record-holders in this regard, President Clinton, President Reagan and President W. Bush, who appointed 357, 347 and 310 Judges, respectively.
Even this calculation is based on the assumption that (a) President Trump will be re-elected and (b) that the Republicans are able to retain the Senate majority of at least 51 votes throughout the two presidential terms. Both assumptions are easy to displace. In fact, the Republicans might as well lose the Senate majority in the November mid-term elections and, given the degree to which the judicial confirmation process has been politicised, none of President Trump’s nominees awaiting a confirmation hearing might receive his or her judicial commission after all. It is clear that a Democratic Senate will not help President Trump elevate conservative Judges to the Federal Courts. In such case, President Trump might end up on the lower end of the SCOTUSBlog ranking with no more than 50 judicial appointments in total.
Judgment In the matter of an application by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland Abortion Case)
The Judgment of the UK Supreme Court In the matter of an application by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland) concerning the compatibility of the Northern Irish abortion law with the European Convention on Human Rights.
Judgment in Steinfeld and Keiden v Secretary of State for the International Development (Civil Partnership Case)
The Judgment of the UK Supreme Court in the case of R (on the app. of Steinfeld and Keiden) v Sec. of State for the International Development concerning the availability of Civil Partnership to heterosexual couples.
On 09 July 2018 President Trump nominated Judge Kavanaugh for the US Supreme Court vacancy created by the retirement of Justice Kennedy. Judge Kavanaugh is a Judge of the Court of Appeals for the powerful DC Circuit and has been serving in this capacity for 13 years. He had been initially appointed to this Court by President Bush after having served under him as a White House staffer. Even more interestingly, in the 1990s, Judge Kavanaugh worked with Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr investigating business deals of then President Bill Clinton in relation to the Whitewater development which famously led to the impeachment and then the eventual acquittal of President Clinton on the charges of perjury and the obstruction of justice in 1999.
Judge Kavanaugh is known to be an originalist with a strong record on gun laws (Heller v. District of Columbia (2011)) and the separation of powers (PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (2017)). On the other hand, many conservative members of the Senate point out that he helped save ObamaCare’s individual mandate when the case was before the Court of Appeals by construing it as a tax (Seven-Sky v. Holder (2011)) and voted to uphold massive data collection by the NSA outside the Fourth Amendment’s protection of privacy (Klayman v. Obama (2015)). Finally, Judge Kavanaugh seems to have no clear record on the right to abortion (but see Garza v. Hargan (2017)) – the most crucial issue for the vast majority of progressive Senators.
In the incoming months, Judge Kavanaugh will face a Senate confirmation hearing and will be asked to answer multiple questions about his judicial and administrative past. The hearing will most likely be a contentious one with many Democratic Senators already vowing to vote against him. However, with a 51 majority, the Senate Republicans are likely to confirm Judge Kavanaugh in time for a new session of the Supreme Court beginning in October 2018. The vote will probably go down along the party lines with a few Democrat Senators from typically Red States perhaps voting for Judge Kavanaugh to strengthen their position before the November mid-term elections.
The most powerful man in America has finally retired. There was no one in the country’s past 30 years who had a bigger impact on the law of the United States than Justice Kennedy. No President, no Majority Leader, no State Governor had power coming even close to that of Justice Kennedy, aka the Swing Vote. The number of cases Justice Kennedy single-handedly decided is breathtaking. He is the man who allowed gay people to marry (Obergefell v. Hodges 2015) and buy firearms (District of Columbia v Heller 2008) at the same time. It seems that President Trump is now likely to appoint another young judge in the vein of Justice Gorsuch, his first pick. Whoever President Trump chooses to replace Justice Kennedy will be subjected to the most vicious confirmation process this country has ever seen. Probably even more vicious than the confirmation hearings of Robert Bork or Clarence Thomas. The President is set to announce his pick on Monday, 9 July.